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I.

INTRODUCTION

Legal rights are said to be fundamental when they are expressed
in or guaranteed by the preeminent laws of a given legal system or
when their existence is essential to the existence and content of
other legal rights of the system.1 Hence, an examination of fundamental rights in a legal system must focus on the system's "constitutional" text, on authoritative judicial interpretations of the text,
and on those rules which are of primary importance to the structure and content of the system.
In European Economic Community (EEC) law, the fundamental
rights of this unique legal system are found in the Treaty of Rome
and in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. This
Article will examine the provisions of the Treaty of Rome in order
to determine which fundamental rights are directly protected
under the Treaty.2 The contribution of the European Court of Justice to the development of the concept of fundamental rights will
then be analyzed. Finally, the system of rights which has developed under the Treaty of Rome will be evaluated in terms of its
contribution to a comprehensive framework for the protection of
human rights in Europe.
This analysis will show that a number of the economic and social
rights protected under European Economic Community law are es*A French translation of this Article has been published in the Revue Internationale de
Droit Compar6, No. 4, 1983.
**Executive Director, Canadian Human Rights Foundation. B.A., University of Manitoba;
LL.B., McGill University; LL.M. (candidate), McGill University. The author wishes to
thank his wife Lise for her research assistance and Dr. Ton Zuijdwijk for his helpful comments and suggestions.
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sentially related to the individual's freedom to achieve purposes or
ideals. Traditionally, the protection of fundamental rights has
meant a concern for the protection of negative liberties, or freedom
from governmental encroachment upon the personal sphere of the
individual.' In recent times, however, the concept of human rights
has been broadened, and many economic and social rights have
gained increasingly wide acceptance. 4 One of the important contributions of European Economic Community law has been to clarify
and to give content to a number of these newly recognized economic and social rights.
In order to be complete, an analysis of fundamental rights in
EEC law must consider its relationship to the European Convention on Human Rights' and to the notion of a comprehensive
human rights code embracing civil and political rights as well as
economic and social rights. Thus, the final section of this Article
will examine the question of accession of the EEC to the European
Convention on Human Rights. First, however, the sources and delimitation of fundamental rights in EEC laws will be examined.
II.
A.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE TREATY OF

ROME

Context
Respect for democratic principles and the rule of law is one of

'

This traditional stress on negative liberties is evident in many of the great human rights

declarations of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, e.g., the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and the Citizen (France 1789), reprinted in F. VAN ASBECK, THE UNruvRSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND ITS PREDECESSORS 48 (1948). For an analysis of the
distinction between "freedom from" and "freedom to," see Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested
Analysis, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1305, 1305-07 (1955). For a brief discussion of the relevance of
the distinction between traditional and contemporary human rights theory, see Sidorsky,
Contemporary Reinterpretations of the Concept of Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 88 (D. Sidorsky ed. 1979).
' Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc.'A/810, at
71 (1948), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), have elaborated a
catalogue of economic, social and cultural rights. For a general discussion of the evolution of
the idea of human rights, see Espiell, The Evolving Concept of Human Rights: Western,
Socialist and Third World Approaches, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AF Tm UssVERSAL DECLARATION

41-65 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1979).

' The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, was signed on November 4, 1950
and came into force on September 3, 1953. Five protocols to the Convention have since been
adopted. The Convention is reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, DnCTORATE OF PRESS AND
INFORMATION, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1978).
4 Insofar as the EEC is not affected, the protection of fundamental rights within the
Member States remains, the responsibility of the individual Member States.
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the fundamental elements of the movement for European integration. Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe7 states that
one of the means by which the achievement of greater unity among
its members shall be pursued is by "the maintenance and further
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms." In addition, article 3 declares that:
[e]very Member of the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within
its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim
of the Council ....
The maintenance and promotion of human rights is, therefore,
one of the stated objectives of the Council of Europe. Moreover, it
is a condition of membership. In 1978, the Council stated that "respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human
rights in each Member State are essential elements of membership
of the European Communities." 9 The European Economic Community generally has acted in accordance with the principle of the
declaration, as evidenced in particular by freezing its "association"
relations with non-democratic Greece in 1967 as an act of
censure.10
B.

General References
The provisions of the Treaty of Rome" stand in contrast to the

bold declarations of the Statute of the Council of Europe. The
Treaty does not, at first glance, appear to be much concerned with
the question of fundamental rights and freedoms. The Treaty has
7 Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 104.

Id. at 106.
* Commission of the European Communities, Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. (2/79) at 11 (1979). Earlier, in
April 1977, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission had adopted a joint
declaration which noted "the prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions of the Member States and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms"
and which proclaimed that "[fin the exercise of their powers and in pursuance of the aims of
the European Communities they respect and will continue to respect these rights." Joint
Declaration on Human Rights, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1 (1977).
1o See Young-Anawaty, Human Rights and the ACP-EEC Lom6 II Convention: Business
As Usual at the EEC, 13 N.Y.U.J. Irr'L L. & POL. 63, 71-72 (1980); see also Press Release
from the Commission of the European Communities, No. 12/1977 (April 5, 1977).
1 Treaty Establishing the European Communities, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. [hereinafter cited as Treaty.]
£
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no general catalogue of fundamental rights, nor does it make any
reference to such a concept. Indeed, the absence of a catalogue of
fundamental rights is a regressive feature of an otherwise progressive document.1 2 Commentators who have attempted to explain the
absence have noted the essentially economic character of the
Treaty and have argued that questions of human rights will normally not arise in the economic field."'
The Treaty approaches a general statement regarding the protection of fundamental rights in its preamble, which refers to the
determination of the Member States to ensure "the economic and
social progress of their countries." It also affirms "as the essential
objective of their efforts the constant improvement of the living
and working conditions of their peoples." And finally, in its ninth
paragraph, the preamble states the resolve of the Member States
"by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace
and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who
share their ideal to join in their efforts."" '
Such vague references unfortunately do not provide any substantive fundamental rights. Nor does the reference in the eighth
paragraph of the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations
help in providing a catalogue of rights.10 Although there are seven
references to human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Charter, 16 it does not contain a general catalogue of fundamental rights.
The general references in the preamble to the Treaty of Rome do
indicate, however, that although the economic character of the
Community was perhaps not felt to be especially relevant to
human rights concerns, the draftsmen were nevertheless well aware
of these concerns. Furthermore, a close examination of the Treaty
reveals that it does contain a number of specific provisions relating
to human rights.7

" See Pescatore, Les droits de l'homme et l'int~grationeurop~ene, 5 CAHIERS DE Dsorr
EUROP9EN 629, 630 (1968).
Is See, e.g., A. TOTH, LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

107 (1978). These arguments are not entirely satisfactory, however, for they do not take into
account the recent evolution of the concept of fundamental rights toward the recognition of
many economic and social rights.
" Treaty, supra note 11, preamble.
Is

Id.

Is For a discussion of human rights and the Charter, see Humphrey, The U.N. Charter
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTs 39 (Luard ed. 1967).
11 A number of authors have mistakenly stated that there are no references to human
rights in the Treaty of Rome. See, e.g., Pescatore, FundamentalRights and Freedoms in
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Specific Provisions

The Treaty of Rome and its related documents, although lacking
a comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights, are nevertheless
quite concerned with a number of these rights. The following table
provides an overview of the extent of this concern:1 8
Provisions in the Treaty of Rome and Related Documents Concerning Fundamental Rights
1. Adequate Standard of Living
(a) Treaty of Rome: Articles 2, 3(i), 39(1), 51, 117, and 123.
2. Freedom of Movement
(a) Treaty of Rome: Articles 3(c), 48, 51, 52, 57(1), and 123.
3. Employment
(a) Treaty of Rome: Articles 3(i), 118, and 123.
4. Non-Discrimination
(a) Treaty of Rome: Articles 7, 37(1), 48(2), 52, 119, and 220.
(b) Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice: Article 76.
(c) Supplementary Rules of Procedure: Articles 4 and 5.
5. Right to Compensation
(a) Treaty of Rome: Article 215.
6. Due Observance of Law
(a) Treaty of Rome: Articles 164, 173, and 179.
7. Democractic Controls
(a) Treaty of Rome: Articles 137, 138(3), and 144.
8. ProceduralRights
(a) Treaty of Rome: Articles 167 and 170.
(b) Statute of the Court of Justice: Articles 3, 4, 6, 17, 28,
and 33.
(c) Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice: Articles 39,
40, and 63.
Each of these categories will be discussed separately.

the System of the European Communities, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 343, 343 (1970). ("The constitution of the European Communities does not contain any provision relating to the protection of human rights"); Schermers, The European Court of Justice: Promoter of European Integration,22 AM. J. COMP. L. 444, 462 (1974) ("The treaties contain no provision for
the general protection of human rights"). However, these statements fail to take into account the conceptual evolution of human rights and the recognition of economic and social
rights as human rights.
"8 The following examination of the Treaty provisions is based in part on the seven-fold
classification of fundamental rights provisions found in Bridge, Fundamental Rights in the

EuropeanEconomic Community, in

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

291, 292-97 (1973). Pescatore has

suggested a two-fold classification of rights guaranteeing equality and rights promoting freedom which, while most interesting, is not as comprehensive as the Bridge classification. See
Pescatore, supra note 12, at 646.
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1.

The Right to an Adequate Standard of Living

Article 2 of the Treaty sets the promotion of "an accelerated
raising of the standard of living" in the Member States as one of
the objectives of the EEC. Article 3 then sets out a list of the activities of the Community for the purposes of article 2, which includes, inter alia, "the creation of a European Social Fund in order
to improve employment opportunities for workers and to contribute to the raising of their standard of living." The Social Fund is
later established by article 123 of the Treaty "in order to improve
employment opportunities for workers in the common market and
to contribute thereby to raising the standard of living . . . . [I]t
shall have the task of rendering the employment of workers easier
and of increasing their geographical and occupational mobility
within the Community." Article 39(1)(b), which deals with the
common agricultural policy of the Community, notes that one of
the objectives of the policy shall be to "ensure a fair standard of
living for the agricultural community." Article 51 authorizes the
Council to make provisions for the social security of migrant workers and their dependents. As a result of article 51, a series of complex regulations concerning the social security of migrant workers
was issued by the Council. 9 These were in turn followed by a considerable body of litigation in the Court of Justice.2 0 Finally, article
117 acknowledges "the need to promote improved working conditions and an improved standard of living for workers."
It may be fairly argued that through these provisions, which seek
generally to raise the standard of living, the Treaty implicitly recognizes a right to an "adequate" standard of living. The notion of
an adequate standard of living would include, as a minimum, the
right to adequate food, clothing and housing. 21 Such an interpretation is in keeping with the spirit and aims of the Treaty 2 since the

"

For discussions of the regulations, see D. LASOK & J.

BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE

305-307 (2d ed. 1976); K. LnSTEIN,
THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN tCONOMIC COMMUNITY 93 (1974); E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELLAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

BROECK,

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

READINGS

LAW AND INSTITUTIONS

IN PERSPECTIVE: TEXT, CASES AND

511-16 (1976).

For discussions of the various cases, see generally D. LASOK & J. BRIDGES, supra note
HAY & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 19; K. LIPSTEIN, supra note 19.
" See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 4, at
50, which states in article 11: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living
conditions."
" The Court has on a number of occasions interpreted the Treaty by reference to the
20

19; E. STEIN, P.

1983]

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN

EEC

LAW

673

purpose in seeking to raise the standard of living is clearly to provide a standard of living which will be generally adequate for the
citizens of the Member States. Thus, recognition of the purposive
nature of the provisions, 2 3 indeed of the Community legal sytem as
a whole, leads to the conclusion that the Treaty recognizes the
right to an adequate standard of living.
2.

Freedom of Movement

In addition to assuring an adequate standard of living, the
Treaty envisages the free movement of persons, services and capital. Article 3(c) provides that the activities of the Community shall
include "the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to
freedom of movement for persons, services and capital." Moreover,
article 48 states that "freedom of movement for workers shall be
secured within the Community by the end of the transitional period at the latest. 2 4 Article 48 also defines the concept of freedom
of movement. The notion of freedom of movement includes the
right to accept offers of employment, to move freely within the territory of Member States, and to stay in a Member State for the
purpose of employment, as well as the right to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that state. 5
spirit or the aims of the instrument. See, e.g., Socift6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau
Ulm GmbH, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357; Bosch v. de Geus, 1962
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 45, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1; Re Noordwijks Cement Accord, 1967 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 75, 6 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 77; F6d6ration Charbonni6re de Belgique v. High
Authority of the ECSC, 1954-1956 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 245, 1956 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 151;
Ireland v. Council, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 285, 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 429.
For a list of further examples of such practice, see D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19,
at 93.
3 For a discussion of the concept of law as a purposive enterprise, see L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (1964); L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1969); Sturm, Lon Fuller's Multidimensional Natural Law Theory, 18 STAN. L. REv. 612 (1966); Summers, Professor
Fuller's Jurisprudenceand America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARv. L. REv. 433
(1978).
" The end of the transitional period was December 31, 1969. See Plender, The Right to
Free Movement in the European Communities, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 305 (1973).
Article 48 states:
2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination
based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.
3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health:
(a) to accept offers of employment actually made;
(b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this
purpose;
(c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accor-
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Article 49 then obliges the Council to issue directives or make regulations in order to progressively implement the principle of free
movement as defined in article 48.26
Article 51 is designed to further facilitate the free movement of
workers by establishing Community legislation permitting the
pooling of social security rights. In essence, the article and relevant
regulations are designed to ensure the aggregation of rights to social benefits for workers.
As articles 48 through 51 deal with the movement of workers,
defined by the courts as all wage-earners or persons subject to a
contract of employment," articles 52 through 58 deal with the
movement of other persons, including merchants, industrialists
and members of liberal professions. Article 52 provides that "restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State shall be abolished." Freedom of establishment is defined
to include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings under the
conditions laid down for nationals by the law of the country where
such establishment is effected. Article 57(1) provides for "the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications" in the case of self-employed persons. Since the
provision of services is in many ways related to the activities of
self-employed persons, article 63 provides for "the abolition of existing restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Community." Furthermore, article 67 states that "Member States shall
progressively abolish between themselves all restrictions on the
movement of capital belonging to persons resident in Member
States." Finally, article 123 provides for the establishment of the
European Social Fund which is designed to render the employment
of workers easier and to increase their geographical and occupadance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that
State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action;
(d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in
implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public
service.
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48
"' For a discussion of the regulations issued under this article, see P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P.
VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIEs 207-09
(1973); A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW 217-21 (1973).
" See, e.g., Caisse Primaire d'Assurance Maladie de S6lestat v. Association du Foot-Ball
Club d'Andlau, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 739, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 383.
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tional mobility within the Community. 2
3.

Employment

In addition to articles 3(i) and 123, which have already been discussed, article 118 of the Treaty deals with a number of employment-related rights. This article charges the Commission with the
task of promoting close cooperation between Member States in
matters relating to employment, labour law, working conditions,
vocational training, prevention of occupational accidents and disease, occupational hygiene, the right of association, and collective
bargaining between employers and workers. The aim of the provision is to establish a right to employment under conditions which
are as favorable as possible. 9 In addition to the above provisions, a
number of other articles touch upon various aspects of employment. These will be discussed in the following sections.
4.

Non-Discrimination

There are a number of provisions in the Treaty which deal with
the prohibition of discrimination. Indeed, the principle of non-discrimination seems to have been considered of particular importance, for the Treaty has a provision of general applicability setting forth the principle. Article 7 states that "within the scope of
application of this Treaty and without prejudice to any special
provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited."30 Although the principle of non-discrimination is clearly one of the fundamental rules of the Community, it is nevertheless subject to possible derogation, since it is
stated to be "without prejudice to any special provisions" of the
Treaty. It has been noted that article 7 refers to discrimination
exercised not only by the Member States but also by individuals.8 1
A number of other articles prohibit discrimination in specific instances. Article 37(1) provides that "Member States shall . . . adjust any State monopolies of a commercial character so as to en" For a discussion of freedom of movement in EEC law, see generally C. MAESTRE'IERi,
CIRCULATION DES PERSONNES ET DES SERVICES DANS LA CEE (1972); Plender, supra
note 24, at 306.
" See Bridge, supra note 18, at 291-94. See also A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 26, at
226.
' The Court of Justice noted in Government of Italy v. Commission, 1963 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 165, 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 289, that similar treatment of dissimilar situations might
well constitute discrimination.
" See A. PARRY & S. HARDY, supra note 26, at 163.

LA LIm
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sure that . . . no discrimination regarding the conditions under

which goods are procured and marketed exists between nationals
of Member States." In addition, article 48(2) requires "the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of
the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and
other conditions of work and emplyment." Article 52, which provides for the right of establishment, also provides for the right to
be subject to the same conditions in "the country where such establishment is effected" as are laid down for the nationals of that
country.
The principle of non-discrimination is further extended by article 119 which prohibits sexual discrimination by requiring Member
States to "maintain the application of the principle that men and
women should receive equal pay for equal work." Although the
provision was initially inspired by economic rather than social considerations, 2 the Court of Justice has nevertheless fully recognized
the human rights dimensions of the equal pay principle. In
Gabrielle Defrenne v. Socit6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation Arienne (SABENA), the Court stated that article 119 "forms part of
the social objectives to the Community, which is not merely an economic union, but is at the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress and seek constant improvement of
the living and working conditions of their peoples."3 The Court
also noted that article 119 had a direct effect and could be relied
upon in national courts.
Article 220, which deals with discrimination on the basis of nationality, provides that "Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals: the protection of persons and
the enjoyment and protection of rights under the same conditions
as those accorded by each State to its own nationals."
A third ground of discrimination is dealt with by article 76 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and by articles 4
and 5 of the Supplementary Rules of Procedure, which effectively
prevent discrimination by providing for free legal aid.34
31 See Bridge, National and TransnationalRegulation of Equal Pay for Equal Work in
England and the European Community, 5 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 117, 120 (1982).
33 Gabrielle Defrenne v. SABENA, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455, 463, 18 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 98, 125.
" See Bridge, supra note 18, at 293. For the most recent codification of the Rules of
Procedure, see 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 39) 1 (1982).
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Right to Compensation

The Treaty also recognizes the right to receive compensation for
damage suffered as a result of the activities of the Community. Article 215 states that "in the case of noncontractual liability, the
Community shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage
caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of
their duties." The three basic elements necessary for a claim under
article 215 are: (i) damage, (ii) an illegal act for which the Community is responsible, and (iii) a causal link between the damage and
the act of the Community. 5 Article 215 refers to "the general principles common to the laws of the Member States." The Court is
thus required to apply these general principles as an additional
source of law.3 6 This notion of "additional sources of law," i.e.
sources in addition to the Treaty itself, has played an important
role in the protection of fundamental rights in EEC law.
6.

Due Observance of Law

The Treaty requires the due observance of law in the activities
of the Community. Article 164 requires the Court of Justice to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the
law is observed." The article does not, however, define "the law" or
its sources. It is this broad wording and lack of definition which
have allowed the Court to draw upon a variety of additional
sources in applying Community law and in protecting fundamental
rights. Under article 164, the Court has delivered a number of important judgments which will be examined in detail in the following section of the Article.
Article 173 adds to the due observance of law requirement by
providing that:
[the] Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the
Council and the Commission other than recommendations or
See, e.g., Alfons Lfltticke GmbH v. Comm'n of the European Communities, 1971 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 325; Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt v. Council of the European
Communities, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 975, 17 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 975.
For further discussion of the issues relating to claims for compensation, see generally D.
LAsOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19, at 57-85; C. VAN REEPINGHEN & P. ORIANNE, LA PROC kDURE DEVANT LA COUR DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUT]S EUROPIENNES

THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, Vol.

(1961); D.

VALENTINE,

1, Jurisdiction and Procedure,

Vol. II, Judgments and Documents (1965); Toth, The Individual and European Law, 24
INT'L

& Comp. L.Q. 659, 690-95 (1975).
LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19, at 32.

" See D.
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opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions
brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on
grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of
law relating to its application, or misuse of powers .3
Finally, article 179, in giving the Court of Justice jurisdiction in
"any dispute between the Community and its servants," provides
for the right of the servants of the Community to have their relations with the Community regulated according to law.
7.

Democratic Control

The Treaty also establishes, to a limited extent, a form of democratic control over the activities of the Community. Article 137
states that "the Assembly, which shall consist of representatives of
the peoples of the States brought together in the Community, shall
exercise the advisory and supervisory powers which are conferred
upon it by this Treaty." Article 143 empowers the Assembly to
"discuss in open session the annual general report submitted to it
by the Commission." Article 144 allows the Assembly to censure
the Commission and to require the resignation of the members of
the Commission as a body.
The Assembly does not have the parliamentary legislative power
usually found in similar domestic institutions; yet, it does have
considerable influence. Although the Assembly does not have the
right to initiate legislation, in practice the Commission usually accepts most of the amendments to its draft legislation which are
proposed by members of the Assembly.ss Moreover, a subsequent
modification of the Treaty of Rome by a treaty of April 22, 1970,
the Treaty of Luxembourg, has conferred upon the Assembly increased budgetary powers over a portion of the Community
budget. 9 Indeed, since 1975, the European Parliament has had the
Article 184, although rarely invoked, adds:
Notwithstanding the expiry of the period laid down in the third paragraph of Article 173, any party may, in proceedings in which a regulation of the Council or of
the Commission is in issue, plead the grounds specified in the first paragraph of
Article 173, in order to invoke before the Court of Justice the inapplicability of
that regulation.
s See The Powers of Europe's Parliament, THE ECONOMIsT, Apr. 21, 1979, at 73.
" See id.; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19, at 142. For a discussion of the Assembly's use of its budgetary power, see European Community: The Power of the Purse, THE
ECONOMIST, Nov. 17, 1979, at 62; European Community: The Parliament Puts its Foot
Down, THE ECONOMIsT, Dec. 15, 1979, at 44; European Community: Life Without a Budget,
THE ECONOMIsT, Dec. 22, 1979, at 35; European Community: The Parliament That Stood
37
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right to reject the entire Community budget.4
Finally, the Assembly's most important power may well be its
power to publicly debate matters involving the running of the
Community. Since 1973, the Assembly sessions have had a question period during which both commissioners and the President of
the Council have had to provide answers.4
Article 138(3) of the Treaty of Rome states that "the Assembly
shall draw up proposals for elections by direct universal suffrage in
accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member States." The
first elections were held in June 1979. 42 The second elections will
take place in June 1984.
8.

ProceduralRights

The Treaty also contains a number of provisions relating to proceedings before the Court of Justice. Article 167 is designed to ensure the independence of the Court by requiring that "the Judges
and Advocates-General . . . be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognized
competence." Articles 3 and 4 of the Statute of the Court of Justice also help to ensure the independence of the Court by providing that "Judges shall be immune from legal proceedings" and that
they shall "not hold any political or administrative office." Article
6 of the Statute of the Court provides for the security of tenure of
the judges by stipulating that they can only be removed from office
by a unanimous decision of the other judges.
Article 166 of the Treaty also establishes the position of Advocate-General, whose duty is to make reasoned submissions "with
complete impartiality and independence" on cases brought before
the Court of Justice in order to assist the Court in the performance
of its duties. The Advocates-General enjoy the same immunities
and privileges as do the judges of the Court.
Article 17 of the Statute of the Court establishes a right to counsel48 and further provides that counsel shall "enjoy the rights and
up Once and Sat Down Again, THE ECONOMIST, June 14, 1980, at 54-57.
40 THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 26, 1980, at 57.
41 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 38, at 73.
"
THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 1979, at 25. See Act concerning the election of representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 278) 5 (1976).
" Protocol Establishing the Court of Justice, Apr. 17, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 147. Article 17
provides "[t]he States and the institutions of the Community shall be represented before
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immunities necessary to the independent exercise of their duties."
Other rights guaranteed by the Statute of the Court include the
right to a public hearing,"" to a record of the hearing,4" and to reasoned, public judgments."
Finally, Article 170 of the Treaty provides for an extension of
the audi alteram partem principle to Member States in situations
where one Member State alleges that another has failed to fulfill
an obligation under the Treaty.47
Some of the rights which have been discussed 4 8 are similar to the
traditional negative rights. Others, of a principally positive nature,
owe their inspiration to the economic nature of the Community's
aims and objects. Some, such as freedom of movement, blend both
the negative and positive aspects of rights. Indeed, the latter phenomenon leads one to question whether the notions of positive and
negative rights are still adequate in a transnational context. For
example, Community law has demonstrated how freedom of movement, which generally has been conceived as a negative right, may
require positive state action in the form of special social security
provisions in order to be meaningful. 9 Perhaps the attempt to
the Court by an agent appointed for each case; ... other parties must be represented by a
lawyer entitled to practice before a court of a Member State." Id. (emphasis added).
44 Article 28 of the Statute states that "[t]he hearing in court shall be public, unless the
Court, of its own motion or on application by the parties, decides otherwise for serious reasons." Id. art. 28.
48 Article 30 of the Statute provides that "[m]inutes shall be made of each hearing and
signed by the President and the Registrar." Id. art. 30.
46 Article 33 of the Statute provides that "judgments shall state the reasons on which
they are based. They shall contain the names of the Judges who took part in the deliberations." Id. art. 33. Article 34 of the Statute adds that "Ujudgments shall be signed by the
President and the Registrar. They shall be read in open court." Id. art. 34.
47 The principle of audi alterampartem provides that both sides of a controversy should
be heard and no man should be condemned unheard. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 120 (rev.
5th ed. 1979). Article 170 of the Treaty of Rome provides:
A Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to fulfill
an obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Before a Member State brings an action against another Member State for an
alleged infringement of an obligation under this Treaty, it shall bring the matter
before the Commission. The Commission shall deliver a reasoned opinion after
each of the States concerned has been given the opportunity to submit its own
case and its observations on the other party's case both orally and in writing ...
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 170.
48 Many of the rights expressed in the Treaty have been further defined and implemented

by secondary legislation. See A.

CAMPBELL, COMMON MARKET LAW

(1969 and Supp. 1969) for

information on such secondary legislation. It is beyond the scope of this Article to deal with
this particular aspect of fundamental rights in European Economic Community Law.
11 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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place rights into separate categories of negative and positive or
civil/political and social/economic has led to the imposition of an
overly mechanistic and lexicographic relationship on rights which
are in reality interdependent and inconceivable outside the context
of each other.50 If so, this would suggest that a unitary approach to
fundamental rights in Europe, with a synthesis of civil/political
and social/economic rights, would be desirable-not only in abstracto, but as the best means of ensuring optimum protection of
the individual's rights and freedoms. This notion will be discussed
51
further in the final section of the Article.
9.

Limitations Clauses

The relativity of the concept of fundamental rights5 2 requires an
examination at this point of the limitations placed by the Treaty
on the rights expressed therein. Limitations clauses dictate the
scope and, at times, even the content of fundamental rights provisions. Hence, a thorough analysis of fundamental rights must necessarily examine the limitations clauses.
There are essentially six limitations to the fundamental rights
provisions of the Treaty. The first is found in article 36 of the
Treaty, which permits deviations from the prohibition on quantitative restrictions on imports and exports "on grounds of public morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and
life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national
treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the
protection of industrial and commercial property." Any such deviations must not, however, "constitute a means of arbitrary
53
discrimination.

50 For a detailed examination of the relationship between civil/political and social/economic rights, see McCbesney, Promoting the General Welfare in a Democratic Society:
Balancing Human Rights and Development, 27 NErHRu.ANs INT'L L.J. 283 (1980).
"1See infra notes 175-178 and accompanying text.
" The notion of absolute and inalienable natural rights, which was a key feature of traditional natural rights theory, has in recent times been held to be untenable. Bentham, in a
colorful remark, once stated that such a notion was "rhetorical nonsense-nonsense upon
stilts." See Lagueur, The Issue of Human Rights, in ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGWTs 5 (D. Sidorsky ed. 1979). See also Kuypers, On the TraditionalFoundations of Human Rights, in LE
FoNDEMENT DES DRorrs DE L'HoMME 69 (Institut International de Philosophie ed. 1966).
" There have been many decisions of the Court on the use and attempted use of article
36 by Member States to justify derogations from the quantitative restrictions prohibition.
See, e.g., Re Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Pork Products into Italy, 1961 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 317, 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 39; I. Schr6der KG v. Oberstadtdirektor der
Stadt KSn, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 905, 16 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 312.
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Article 48(3) provides that the right of free movement of workers
may be "subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health.' '1" Article 55 exempts any activities in a Member State which "are connected, even occasionally,
with the exercise of official authority" from the operation of the
right of establishment. Article 56 further provides that the right of
establishment "shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for
special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy,
public security or public health." Under this article, a Member
State may expel undesirable foreigners whether they are
layabouts, 55 unfit-for-work migrants, 56 carriers of certain disease,
or political agitators, 7 so long as their conflict with the law of the
state is exclusively the result of the personal conduct of the individuals concerned within the meaning of Council Directive 64/221
of 25 February 1964.18
While the above limitative provisions relate essentially to freedom of movement, two other articles in the Treaty reserve for the
Member States national control over the traditional limitation areas of state security and order maintenance. Article 223 states that
"no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the dis-

Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48. See K. Ln'STmN, supra note 19, at 133-34 (brief discussion of Council Directive 64/221 of 25 February 1964 and of other directives which deal with
this matter).
" Wiesbaden v. Barulli, 7 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 239; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19, at
313.
Re Expulsion of an Italian National, 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 285; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE,
supra note 19, at 313.
57 See Rutili v. Minister of the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1219, 17 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 140 (Preliminary Ruling); D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19, at 313.
s 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. 850 (1964). Article 2 of Directive No. 64/221 prohibits measures
taken under the guise of public policy solely for economic ends. Article 3 then states:
1. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or of public security shall be based
exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.2. Previous criminal convictions shall not in themselves constitute grounds for the taking of such
measures.3. Expiry of the identity card or passport used by the person concerned
to enter the host country and to obtain a residence permit shall not justify expulsion from the territory. 4. The State which issued the identity card or passport
shall allow the holder of such document to re-enter its territory without any formality even if the document is no longer valid or the nationality of the holder is in
dispute.
Article 4 provides a limitative list of the diseases and disabilities which may be invoked for
refusing entry on the grounds of public health. Articles 5 through 9 provide certain administrative and procedural rights to persons involved in disputes concerning actions based on
one of the three grounds of public policy, security or health. See A. PARRY & S. HARDY,
supra note 26, at 244.
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closure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of
its security" and allows a Member State to "take such measures as
it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests
of its security which are connected with the production of or trade
in arms, munitions and war material." Article 224 deals with the
"measures which a Member State may be called upon to take in
the event of war or serious international tension constituting a
threat of war, or in order to carry out undertakings into which it
has entered for the purpose of maintaining peace and international
security." Under article 225, the Court of Justice is empowered to
decide on claims by the Commission or a Member State that another Member State is "making improper use of the powers provided for in Articles 223 and 224." 59
The limitations provisions, particularly those relating to security
and order maintenance, leave a considerable amount of power and
discretion in the hands of national authorities. Lasok and Bridge
have argued that the Treaty, by safeguarding certain state interests in this fashion, has reduced the scope of arbitrary "emergency" action which states may be tempted to take to protect their
"sovereign rights."60 While the provisions may be helpful to the
extent that they provide an escape valve for avoiding or reducing
Community tension, they are far too broadly worded to offer, in
themselves, any measure of protection of fundamental rights. Indeed, their wording is such that they could permit very serious violations of fundamental rights. Ultimately, it is the Court of Justice
which may be the best safeguard of fundamental rights in this
context."'
It should also be noted that despite the number of provisions in
the Treaty of Rome dealing with fundamental rights, the Treaty
still lacks a comprehensive catalogue of rights. There remains a
large gap in the protection of fundamental rights under the Treaty.
Again, it has largely fallen upon the Court of Justice to try to fill
this gap. The next section of the Article will examine the role of
the Court of Justice in protecting fundamental rights in the European Economic Community.
69 See Eek, Neutrality and the European Communities, in LEGAL PROBLEMS OF AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 135, 143 (M. Bathurst, K. Simmonds, N. Hunnigs & J. Welch
eds. 1972).
6'See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19, at 77.
' Although the Court is not the only safeguard, see supra notes 58-59 and accompanying
text, it is nevertheless the final arbiter and a most important bulwark against violations of
fundamental rights.
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RIGHTS AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE

A.

Early Jurisprudence
In its early jurisprudence, the Court of Justice made little attempt to fill the gap created by the nonexistence of a comprehensive catalogue of rights. In its early decisions, the Court refused to
consider any rights other than those specifically mentioned in the
Treaty. The Court rejected arguments for the protection of fundamental rights based upon the human rights provisions of national
constitutions. The Court stated that its task was not to ensure respect for domestic rules of law, including constitutional provisions
concerning the protection of fundamental rights, and refused to go
beyond the precise text of the Treaty.62
One of the first cases to raise the fundamental rights issue was
Stork v. High Authority.s" The plaintiff in that case, a German
company, considered that its interest had been adversely affected
by a reorganizational measure imposed upon the Ruhr coal mining
industry by the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) and sought the annulment of the ECSC decision. In support of its argument, the plaintiff invoked articles 2
and 12 of the Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
which guarantee the free development of the human personality
and the free choice of trade or profession."" The Court, however,
" See, e.g., Priisident Ruhrkohlen-Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v. High Authority, 1960 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 423, 6 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 857; Stork v. High Authority, 1959 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 17; Sgarlatta v. Commission of the European Communities, 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 215, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 314.
" 1959 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 17.
" Articles 2 and 12 of the BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY provide:
2. (1) Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in
so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person. The
liberty of the individual shall be inviolable. These rights may only be encroached
upon pursuant to a law.
12. (1) All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their trade, occupation,
profession, their place of work and their place of training. The practice of trades,
occupations and professions may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.
(2) No specific occupation may be imposed on any person except within the
framework of a traditional compulsory public service that applies generally and
equally to all.
(3) Forced labour may be imposed only on persons deprived of their liberty by
court sentence.
PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE, GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, BASIC LAW FOR THE FED-

ERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1969). For commentary
CREIFELDS, STAATSBORGER-TASCHEN-BUCH (1981).

on the Basic Law, see 0.

MODEL & C.
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refused to concern itself with the provisions of the German Basic
Law. 6 5 Similarly, in the case of Ruhrkohlenverkaufsgesellschaften
v.High Authority,6 one of the plaintiffs invoked article 14 of the
Grundgesetz f(ir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 67 which guarantees the right to private property. The Court again rejected the
argument by stating that its task was not to ensure respect for municipal law. In the later case of Sgarlatta v. Commission of the
European Communities,8 a number of Italian citrus fruit producers sought the annulment of various Community regulations. In
support of their claim, the producers invoked the vague notion of
the "fundamental principles" governing the legal protection of fundamental rights in all Member States. Once again, the argument
was not accepted by the Court. In this manner, the Court of Justice appeared to safeguard the principle of Community uniformity.
Had the court sought to protect individuals on the basis of the
arguments respecting the municipal human rights provisions of
Member States, which in a number of instances varied from state
to state, the Court might have been faced with a serious threat to
uniformity. Yet, the decisions, while protecting uniformity and the
autonomy of Community law, did nothing to correct the lacunae in
the protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal system. More importantly, in all of the cases the Court, having rejected the arguments on the ground that it only had competence to
apply Community Law rather than national law, did not address
the further question of whether similar analogous guarantees could
be provided by Community law itself.69
These early decisions, characterized by legal scholars as "the sins
" Stork v. High Authority, 1959 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 17, 43.
1960 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 423, 438.
' Article 14 of the BASIc LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY states:
(1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits
shall be determined by the laws.(2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also
serve the public weal.(3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal.
It may be effected only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature
and extent of the compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse may
be had to the ordinary courts. According to this principle of proportionality, the
burden imposed upon an individual by the public authorities must not be dispro-

"

portionate to the public benefit sought to be attained.
PRESs AND INFORMATION OFFICE, GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1969).
" 1965 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215.
" Pescatore, supra note 17, at 348.
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of youth, "'
gave way in the early 1970's to a series of dynamic,
imaginative judgments which sought to reconcile the needs for uniformity and for greater protection of fundamental rights.
Later Jurisprudence: The Development of an Activist
Approach

B.

The problem of the protection of fundamental rights had grown
even more acute with the clear affirmation by the Court of the
supremacy of Community law over national constitutions.7 The
Court's decision in Internationale Handelsgeselishaft mbH v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fair Getreide und Futtermittel meant
that, in matters which fell within Community competence, individuals no longer had the protection of their constitutional human
rights laws, but at the same time they were not, in many instances,
given similar safeguards under European Economic Community
law. 2 The existence of a vacuum in the area of fundamental rights
thus became even more evident and problematic. The Court of
Justice then moved in bold and imaginative fashion in an attempt
to remedy the problem. In a departure from its earlier jurisprudence, the Court ruled in a number of important decisions that the
protection of fundamental rights formed an integral part of Community law.
1.

Treaty Basis

The basis for the Court's activist role was found in a broad interpretation of article 164 of the Treaty of Rome, which states that
"the Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and
application of this Treaty the law is observed." The very general
terms of this article allowed for an interpretation which gave it a
much broader meaning than at first seemed apparent. The Court
found that the words "observance of law and justice" could be
given a broader meaning than simply the interpretation and application of Community rules. Indeed, taken in a broad sense, the
words allowed decisions to be based on law other than Treaty law
as well as on Treaty law. Consequently, the Court found a great
70 Hilf, The Protectionof FundamentalRights in the
THE INDIVIDUAL 145, 148 (F. Jacobs ed. 1976).

Community, in

EUROPEAN LAW AND

71 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und
Futtermittel, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 255 (Preliminary
Ruling).
" Toth, supra note 35, at 667.
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deal of freedom to search for general principles of law. It proceeded to do so, based on the notion that Community law must be
considered to have a very broad legal source, consisting not merely
of the written law of the Treaty and enactments of the Community
institutions, but also of a set of broad principles of law common to
73
the legal systems of the Member States of the Community.
The broad interpretation of article 164 is supported by the wording of articles 173 and 215 of the Treaty. Article 173, which is concerned with proceedings taken against acts of the Community institutions, states in effect that the Court of Justice must control or
supervise the legality of Community actions for violations of the
Treaty and also for the violation of "any rule of law relating to its
application. ' ' 74 Article 215 also makes reference to "the general
principles common to the laws of the Member States. 7' The general wording of both articles lends support to the notion that Community law consists not only of the written text of the Treaty and
of Community enactments but also of those unspecified rules of
law pertaining to the application of the Treaty."
The broad interpretation of these articles introduced a large
opening through which the Court began to actively ensure the pro'$ The inspiration for the Court's departure from its earlier decisions appears to have
come from a brilliant article by Pierre Pescatore, published in 5 CAHMRS Dn DRorr
EUROPftNNE 629, 642 (1968), and from the opinion of the European Commission in Stauder
v. City of Ulm, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 112 (Preliminary Ruling), in which the Commission stressed that Community institutions were under an obligation to maintain fundamental rights based on the "common constitutional traditions" of the
Member States. See Drzemczewski, Fundamental Rights and the European Communities:
Recent Developments, in 2 THE HUM. RTS. Rxv. 69, 70 (1977).
Article 173 of the Treaty provides:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission other than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have
jurisdiction in actions brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission
on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application,
or misuse of powers. Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions,
institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another
person, is of direct and individual concern to the former.
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 173.
ld. art. 215 states in part:
I'
The contractual liability of the Community shall be governed by the law applicable to the contract in question. In the case of non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the
Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
7' See Pescatore, supra note 17, at 348. See also Pescatore, supra note 12.
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tection of fundamental rights in Community law. It now had the
latitude to search not only within the four corners of the Treaty
itself, but also within the common legal principles of the Member
States. The following section of the Article will examine in detail
the major decisions of the Court which established its important
role in the protection of fundamental rights.
2. Decisions of Principle
The case of Stauder v. City of Ulm 77 was the first to signal a
departure from the Court's earlier jurisprudence. In the Stauder
case, the Commission had authorized Member States to sell butter
at a reduced price to certain categories of needy people in order to
reduce a Community butter surplus. In order to prevent fraud,
however, the recipients of the social assistance measure were required to show a coupon-card bearing the name of the recipient.
Mr. Stauder, a resident of Ulm, Germany and a beneficiary under
the assistance program, considered the coupon-card requirement to
be a violation of his constitutional rights to human dignity 78 and to
equality before the law.7 He therefore challenged the requirement
before the Verwaltungsgericht of Stuttgart, which referred the
matter to the Court of Justice.8 0

11

1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 112.

70 Article 1 of the BASIc

LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

provides:

(1) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the
duty of all state authority.(2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every human community, of peace
and of justice in the world.(3) The following basic rights shall be binding as directly valid law on legislation, administration and judiciary.
PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE, GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1969).

"Article

3 of the BAsIc LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY states:
(1) All persons shall be equal before the law.(2) Men and women shall have equal
rights.(3) No one may be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, his parentage,
race, language, homeland and origin, faith or his religious and political opinion.

PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICE, GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, BASIc LAW FOR THE FED-

RAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1969).
The Verwaltungsgericht submitted the following question to the Court of Justice:
Is it compatible with the general principles of Community law in force that the
decision of the Commission of the European Communities of 12 February 1969
(69/71/EEC) makes the allocation of butter at a reduced price to the beneficiaries
of certain social assistance schemes dependent on the disclosure of the beneficiary's name to the sellers (Article 4 of the decision)?
Stauder v. City of Ulm, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 419, 427, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 112, 114
(Preliminary Ruling).
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Advocate-General Roemer declared in his opinion on the case
that:
common conceptions of value in the national constitutional law,
in particular, national basic rights, must be established by a comparative evaluation of the law and these common conceptions
must be observed as unwritten components of Community law in
the formulation of secondary Community law. Consequently, the
Court may quite properly be requested to test the validity of a
decision of the Commission against this criterion."1
The Court, in its judgment in the case, chose to depart from its
former attitude of aloofness and addressed itself, though only in
passing, to the question of fundamental rights. The Court remarked that the Commission authorization did "not contain any
element that might jeopardize the fundamental rights of the individual contained in the general principles of the law of the Community of which the Court must ensure the observance. ' 8 2 Thus,

the Stauder case marked the first step in the evolution of the jurisprudence of the Court.
The second major step came in the case of Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle far Getreide und Futtermittel.ss Under Community regulations, import
and export licenses could only be obtained subject to the payment
of a deposit. In this case, the export-import firm had lost a substantial part of its deposit for failure to comply with export license
requirements. The firm brought an action in the Verwaltungsgericht of Frankfurt am Main, which referred the matter to the
Court of Justice. 4
One of the arguments raised before the Court was that the regulations were invalid because they infringed the principle of proportionality (Verhiltnism~issigkeit), developed by the German Federal
Constitutional Court, which is applicable under articles 2 and 14 of
SI Id. at 428, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 115.

Id. at 425, 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 119.
1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 255 (Preliminary Ruling).
The questions submitted by the Verwaltungsgericht to the Court were the following:

1. Whether the obligation to export laid down in Article 12(1)(iii) of E.E.C. Council Regulation 120/67 dated 13 June 1967, the requirement of a deposit and the
power to order forfeiture of such deposit if the articles are not exported within the
period of the license, are lawful.2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, whether Article 9 of E.E.C. Commission Regulation 473/67 dated 21 August 1967, in its application to Regulation 120/67, is lawful in that it excludes the power to order forfeiture of the deposit only in cases of force majeure.
Id. at 1127, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 258.
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the Grundgesetz ftir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 5 In its
judgment, the Court first made it very clear that Community law
overrides national constitutions."6 Therefore, the validity of a
Community instrument could not be affected by allegations that it
struck "at either the fundamental rights as formulated in that
State's constitution or the principles of a national constitutional
structure." However, the Court then went on to explicitly state
that:
[a]n examination should .. be made as to whether some analogous guarantee, inherent in Community law, has not been infringed. For respect for fundamental rights has an integral part in
the general principles of law of which the Court of Justice ensures
respect. The protection of such rights, while inspired by the constitutional principles common to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the Community's structure and
objectives. We should therefore examine ...

whether the deposit

system did infringe fundamental rights respect
for which must be
87
ensured in the Community's legal order.

The Court then proceeded to analyze the deposit system on this
basis and concluded that the system did not infringe any rights of
a fundamental character. Thus, in the Handelsgesellschaft case
the Court moved from an earlier passing reference to fundamental
rights to a systems analysis based on the criterion of respect for
fundamental rights. The Stauder and Handelsgesellschaft cases
together affirmed the existence of a Community concept of fundamental rights and laid the foundation for the development of a
broad Community system of rights.
This process was taken a step further in J. Nold, Kohlen- und
Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Commission of the European Communi" For the text of article 2 of the

BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,

supra note 64. The text of article 14 is set forth supra note 67.
The Court stated:
Recourse to legal rules or concepts of national law to judge the validity of instru-

ments promulgated by Community institutions would have the effect of harming
the unity and efficacy of Community law. The validity of such instruments can
only be judged in the light of Community law. In fact, the law born from the
Treaty, the issue of an autonomous source, could not, by its very nature, have the
courts opposing to it rules of national law of any nature whatever without losing
its Community character and without the legal basis of the Community itself being put in question:
1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1134, 11 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 283.
67

Id.

see
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ties,88 in which the Court moved toward an optimum standard of
fundamental rights. 8" The Court, after reaffirming that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law of
which it must ensure the observance, stated:
[iln assuring the protection of such rights, the Court is required
to base itself on the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and therefore could not allow measures which are
incompatible with the fundamental rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitutions of such States. The international treaties on human rights in which the Member States have co-operated or to which they have adhered can also supply indications
which may be taken into account within the framework of Community law.90
The Court then indicated that the fundamental rights protected by
the constitutional laws of all of the Member States included the
right of property and the free exercise of trade, labour and other
commercial activities.91
These three decisions, in addition to affirming the existence of a
Community concept of fundamental rights, also identified certain
rights and thus gave specific content to the concept. The cases recognized the right to human dignity, the principle of proportionality, the right of property, and the free exercise of trade, labour and
other commercial activities as part of the Community concept of
fundamental rights. A number of other decisions of the Court also
have recognized certain general principles of law and, in so doing,
have given further specific content to the concept. 92 Thus, the
Court has recognized the general requirement of certainty, 93 the
right to be convicted only once for a single offence,9 as well as the
principles of good faith, respect for vested rights, and the exigen-

1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 338.

69 Commission of the European Communities, The Protection of FundamentalRights in
the European Communities, BuLL. EUR. COMM. Supp. (5/76) at 9 (1976).
1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 491, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 338-39.
Id. at 508, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 354.
Il
For a very interesting comparative examination of fundamental rights in the legal systems of the Member States, see Bernhardt, The Problems of Drawing up a Catalogue of
FundamentalRights for the European Communities, Buu. EuR. COMM. Supp. (5/76) at 19
(1976).
o3 Westzucker GmbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstee ffir Zucker, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
723, 739, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. Rm. (CCH) 8977.
4 Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Comm'n of the European Communities, 1972 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1281, 1294, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 864, 870 (opinion of the Advocate
General).
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cies of the proper administration of justice, including procedural
fairness, legality, and equality.95
In addition, a series of more recent cases has further elaborated
upon the reference in the Nold case to international human rights
treaties. In Rutili v. Minister of the Interior,France,96 the Court
stated:
Taken as a whole, these limitations placed on the powers of
member-States in respect of control of aliens found in Articles 2
and 3 of Directive 64/221 and Article 8 of Regulation 1612/68 are
a specific manifestation of the more general principle, enshrined
in Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4
November 1950 and ratified by all the member-States, and in Ar7
ticle 2 of Protocol 4 of the same Convention.
Thus, for the first time the Court made specific use of an international human rights treaty in support of its reasoning. In the more
recent case of Hauer v. Land Rheinland Pfalz,9 8 the Court based
its decision squarely on article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights. In this case, an application by a German landowner to plant vines on land which had
not previously been so planted was rejected because of a Community regulation which prohibited the granting of new permits. The
landowner challenged the denial of the application and pleaded,
inter alia, the incompatibility of the Community regulation with
certain fundamental rights provisions in articles 12 and 14 of the
German Basic Law.99 Both the Court and Advocate-General
Capotorti reaffirmed the primacy of Community law in such cases
of conflict. Both the Court and the Advocate-General also reaffirmed the notion that the right to property and the right to freely
pursue a trade or profession are protected as fundamental rights
under Community law. Signore Capotorti undertook a detailed
analysis of the right to property under the common constitutional
law of the Member States and under article 1 of the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention for the Protection of
"1 See Pescatore, supra note 12, at 643-44; Dubois, Le RMle de la Cour de Justice des
communanth8 europkenes: objet et portke de la protection, 2 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE
DRorr Co n AR 601, 620 n.43 (1981).
" 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 140.
" Id. at 1232, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 155.
" 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 3762, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 42, 58.
" For the text of article 12, see supra note 64. For the text of article 14, see supra note
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 00 and concluded that:
Article 2 of Council Regulation 1162/76 is not contrary to any
of the principles of Community law intended to protect individuals; in particular, it does not infringe the fundamental right to the
peaceful enjoyment of private property, which is recognized in
Community law both on the basis of the internal legal orders of
the Member States and under Article 1 of the First Additional
Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. '
Thus, the conclusion in the Hauer case rests upon an examination
of the internal legal orders of the Member States and upon a detailed analysis of the First Protocol to the European Convention
on Human Rights.
In the subsequent case of National Panasonic (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Commission of the European Community,10° the Court did not
even mention common constitutional principles; its analysis of the
right to privacy was based solely upon the European Convention
on Human Rights. In Panasonic,an English company had brought
an action against the Commission after Commission investigators
had presented themselves at the company's premises with a search
warrant and proceeded to search the premises. The company complained that it had not previously received any request for access
to its premises or notice of the imminence of the warrant and had,
therefore, been unable to dispute its validity before submitting to
the search. For this reason, the company alleged that its right to
privacy, its right to be heard and its right to prepare for the investigation had been violated. The company's action was ultimately
dismissed by the Court and the applicant was ordered to pay costs.
,00 Article 1 states:

Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.

First Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
1011979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 3765, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 60.
10 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2033, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 169. For a discussion of the
Panasoniccase, see Recent Development, National Panasonic(U.K.) Ltd. v. E.C. Commission-Antitrust Investigations in the European Economic Community: Prior Notice and
FundamentalRights, 11 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 177 (1981).
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In arriving at its conclusion, the Court examined the applicability
of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights"' and
decided that the Commission had not infringed the right invoked
by the applicant. As previously mentioned, the Court discussed the
right to privacy solely in relation to the European Convention on
Human Rights, making no mention of common constitutional principles. Indeed, the Court seems to have simply assumed that the
right to privacy, in the broad sense of article 8 of the Human
Rights Convention, was a fundamental right protected by Community law. This is evidenced by the Court's discussion of the applicability of the exception to the right. The judgment indicates an
assumption by the Court that the Convention, insofar as its provisions apply to the Community context, forms an integral part of
the Community legal order.
This assumption by the Court of Justice is particularly interesting in view of the case of Surjit Kaur v. The Lord Advocate'" of
the Court of Sessions of Scotland (Outer House) which was decided in the same year as Panasonic and in which it was held, inter alia, that the European Convention on Human Rights was not
enforceable by the Scottish courts under section 2 of the European
Communities Act. 0 5 The plaintiffs in this case had argued that the
European Convention on Human Rights was enforceable in Scotland as part of Community law. Since the Convention formed part
of Community law and since Community law was enforceable
under the European Communities Act, it was argued that the court
was obliged to enforce the Convention. Had this ingenious argu1"

Article 8 states that "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,

his home and his correspondence." The article further stipulates that there shall be no interference with this right:
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democractic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 8.
0 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 79 (1980).
,00 Id. at 98-99. Section 2 of the European Communities Act provides:
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the
Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the
United Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly; and the expression 'enforceable Community right'
and similar expressions shall be read as referring to one to which this subsection

applies.
European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68.
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ment been accepted, the United Kingdom would have received a
Bill of Rights "through the back door." The court did not, however, accept the argument. Lord Ross stated that "the European
Court does not deal with fundamental rights as such in the abstract; it only deals with them if they arise under Treaties and
have a bearing on Community law questions."'" Lord Ross then
added that "the issue raised in the present case has no Community
law content at all. The pursuers here are not seeking to protect
some economic right, but merely to assert a right alleged to be con107
ferred on them by the Convention.'

Therefore, according to the Scottish court, the activist judgments of the Court of Justice have not led to the enforceability of
the European Convention on Human Rights per se before United
Kingdom courts. Nevertheless, one may ask whether the Convention on Human Rights, to the extent that it forms an integral part
of Community law, is enforceable in the United Kingdom courts in
those instances in which the case at bar has "Community law content." In such cases, there could perhaps be a "back door Bill of
Rights" upon which United Kingdom citizens may rely.
As the previous discussion illustrates, the central question is
whether the Human Rights Convention does indeed form an integral part of Community law. The view that it does form part of
Community law has been espoused by the Commission'"8 and by
several legal scholars. 09 Although the support for this conclusion is
still not overwhelming, a continual movement by the Court toward
this position is clearly discernible. The Panasonic case and the
other cases which have been reviewed in the above analysis show
that the Court is willing to continue evolving and expanding the
concept of fundamental rights. There can be little doubt that the
Court is steadily moving toward the unequivocal conclusion that
the Convention on Human Rights, insofar as it is applicable to the
Community context, forms part of Community law.
3. Sources of FundamentalRights
The following section of the Article will summarize and structure
,o 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 96 (1980).
1 Id. at 97.
1 Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 10.
'"
See, e.g., Young-Anawaty, supra note 10, at 71-72. See also Alkeman, The E.C. and
the European Convention on Human Rights-Immunity and Impunity for the Community?, noted in Economides & Weiler, Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights: Commission Memorandum, 42 MOD. L. Riv. 683, 688 (1979).
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some of the essential principles found in the cases discussed above.
There are three general sources of fundamental rights in Community law, apart from the provisions of the Treaty itself. This section shall briefly examine each in turn.
a.

General Principles of Law

The Court of Justice has, in a substantial number of cases, recognized a number of general principles of law as part of Community law.110 These principles include very broad concepts, such as
good faith, and more specific notions, such as the right to be convicted only once for a single offence."' Although some of these
general principles have clearly drawn their inspiration from doctrines of public international or municipal law, others, such as the
notion of "comparable price conditions to consumers in compara'
ble circumstances," remain untraceable. 12
b.

Common ConstitutionalProvisions

As previously noted, the Court, in protecting fundamental rights,
is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Member States. The Court, therefore, cannot uphold
measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights commonly recognized and protected by the constitutions of Member
States.
One interesting point observed by Hill 1 3 is that the Court, in
the Nold case, did not speak of traditions common to all constitutions of the Member States, but of rights protected by the constitutions of those States. This formula indicates that the Court does
not seek a common minimum standard, that is, a principle common to all of the Member State constitutions. Since "the catalogue
of fundamental rights and guarantees.

. .

of the Member States of

such an apthe European Communities differ so appreciably,"'
proach would effectively render the whole procedure virtually
meaningless. Rather, the formula indicates that the Court will seek
For an analysis of the concept of general principles of law, see Reuter, Le recours de la
Cour de justice des Communautks europkennes & des principesggn~raux de droit, in MtLANGES HENRI ROLIN 263 (1964).

.. For
munities,
See
M' See
"' See

"'

a list of principles recognized by the Court, see Commission of the European Comsupra note 89, at 9.
D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 19, at 96.
Hilf, supra note 70, at 149.
Bernhardt, supra note 92, at 27.
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an "optimum standard of fundamental rights."11
However, Hilf also has argued that the maximum standard approach means that any rule of Community law which is in conflict
with any of the rights guaranteed by any of the Member State constitutions will be invalidated.11 6 The argument is flawed, however,
in that it ignores the elements of commonality and unity of Community law. The Court, keeping in mind that general respect for
fundamental rights is a basic element of all of the Member State
constitutions, has sought a reasonable degree of convergence in national measures for the protection of fundamental rights. In this
manner, the Court has avoided an overly rigid approach in its
search for "common principles" while still retaining the elements
of commonality and unity of Community law.
c. InternationalHuman Rights Law
The Court also has indicated that international human rights
treaties on which the Member States have collaborated or of which
they are signatories also form part of Community law. 17 Most
writers, in dealing with this source of fundamental rights, have
stressed the need for unanimity of Member State participation in
the international human rights treaties. " 8 A question which does
not seem to have been considered, however, is whether the optimum standard approach, with its search for a reasonable degree of
convergence, could be used in the area of international human
rights law. There is no reason why the arguments used to support
the notion in the field of comparative constitutional law would not
be equally applicable to the field of public international law. This
approach would allow the Court greater scope and flexibility; yet it
would no more undermine the elements of commonality and unity
of Community law than does the search for common constitutional
118Commission of the European Communities, supra note 89, at 9.
11 See Hilf, supra note 70, at 149. The author states that "the reference to [the] constitutions of Member States indicates that the Court will observe a maximum standard, that is
to say, it will invalidate any rule of Community law which is in conflict with any of the

rights guaranteed by any of the Member States constitutions." Id. (emphasis added).
1" Firma J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustroffgrosshandlung v. Comm'n of the European Communities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 338. See Schermers, The
European Court of Justice:Promotor of European Integration, 22 Am.J. CoMP. L. 444, 454
(1974).
18 See, e.g., Pescatore, The Protectionof Human Rights in the European Communities,
9 COMMON MKT. L. Rav. 73, 75-76 (1972); Sorensen, The Enlargement of the European
Communities and the Protection of Human Rights, 1971 Eui. Y.B. 3, 5-6 (Council of
Europe).
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provisions. In this manner, the Court could look to documents
other than the European Convention on Human Rights, such as
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural

Rights.11
A related question is the status of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 120 vis-A-vis Community law. Many legal scholars
now believe that the Universal Declaration, although originally of
no legally binding effect, has now become part of customary international law.1" 2' Given this transformation in the juridical character
of the Declaration, there is nothing to prevent the Court from
looking to the Declaration as a guide to the protection of fundamental rights within the Community. The very nature of customary international law implies common acceptance by the international community. Therefore, if the optimum standard approach is
applied to public international law as well as to comparative constitutional law, the Universal Declaration could serve as an additional source of fundamental rights-without endangering the
commonality and unity of Community law.
' See supra note 4.
110 See supra note 4.

"' See Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf.32/41, at 4 (1968). See also Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights,
New York (1968), reprinted in 9 J. INr'L COMM'N JURISTS (No. 1) 94, 95 (1968), which provides that the "Universal Delcaration of Human Rights constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the Charter of the highest order, and has over the years become a part of customary law." McDougal, Lasswell and Chen have stated that "[w]hat began as mere
common aspiration is now hailed both as an authoritative interpretation of the human
rights provisions of the United Nations Charter and as established customary law, having
the attributes of jus cogens and constituting the heart of a global bill of rights." M. McDouGAL, H. LASsWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 279 (1980). For a
discussion of the influence of the Universal Declaration on United Nations practice and on
national constitutions, statutes and decisions, see id. at 328-30. See also L. SOHN & T. BuERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 518-20 (1973); Espiell, supra note
4, at 45-46; Humphrey, The InternationalBill of Rights: Scope and Implementation, 17
WM.& MARY L. Rav. 527, 529 (1976); Humphrey, The Universal Declarationof Human
Rights: Its History, Impact and JuridicalCharacter,in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION

21-37 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1979); Marcoux, Protectionfrom

Arbitrary Arrest and Detention under InternationalLaw, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
345, 348 (1982); Nayar, Human Rights: The United Nations and the United States Foreign Policy, 19 HARv. INT'L L.J. 813, 816-17 (1978); Pechota, The Development of the Cove-

nant on Civil and PoliticalRights, in

THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS

32, 38 (L. Henkin

ed. 1981); Sohn, The Universal Declarationof Human Rights, 8 J. INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 17,
26 (1967); Tunkin, InternationalLaw in the InternationalSystem, 147 RECUEIL DES COURS
143, 148 (1975); Waldock, Human Rights in ContemporaryInternationalLaw and the Significance of the European Convention, Irr'L & COMP. L.Q. (Supp. No. 11) (1965); Address
by William J. Butler to McGill International Law Society (Jan. 20, 1980); Shestack, The
Case of the Disappeared,8 HUM. RTS. 24, 27 (1980).
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4. Restrictions on Fundamental Rights
As can be expected, the Court has not viewed the concept of fundamental rights as an absolute concept. Indeed, the Court has
noted that within the Community context:
[TIhese rights are far from constituting unfettered prerogatives,
but must be viewed in the light of the social function of the property and activities protected thereunder. For this reason, rights of
this nature are protected by law subject always to limitations laid
down in accordance with the public interest. Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights
should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the
overall objectives pursued by the Community on condition that
the substance of these rights is left untouched.1 22
Nevertheless, the Court has generally sought to limit the scope
of the public order, public security and public health exceptions to
the Treaty rights. 23 Professor Cerexhe has noted that, while restrictive measures are permitted, they should be imposed only in
cases involving conduct which constitutes a real and grave threat
to a fundamental societal interest."2 4 In this fashion, the Court has
generally sought to provide the greatest possible protection of fundamental rights, despite the relativity of the concept and the existence of the limitations provisions of the Treaty.
5.

Criticisms of the Court of Justice

The progressive evolution in the approach of the Court of Justice to the question of fundamental rights has not been without
critics. Some have argued that the Court's acknowledgement of
such a large number of rights-the right to ownership, to profession, to work, and to other matters-has exceeded the limits of judicial legislation. 25 Others have argued that the restrictions placed
on the rights, such as "the overall objectives pursued by the Community," are so broad and imprecise as to seriously limit the scope
IJ. Nold,

Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Comm'n of the European Communi-

ties, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 508, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 338, 354-55.
"I For a discussion of the "limitations" provisions of the Treaty, see supra notes 52-61
and accompanying text.
11"E. Cerexhe, Remarks on the Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Communities at the September 1981 meeting of the Institut de Droit d'ExpressionFrancaisein
Montreal.
125 See Hilf, supra note 70, at 154.
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of protection."2
While the latter criticisms are not entirely without validity, the
Court has nevertheless been sensitive to the protection of fundamental rights. The majority of scholars have applauded the progressive evolution of the Court's jurisprudence. 2 7 In addition, the
European Parliament, Council and Commission adopted in April
1977 a declaration which stressed "the prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions of the Member States and the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms."1 2 8 In so doing, the three institutions formally espoused
the progressive development of the concept of fundamental rights
in Community law.
C.

Problems of Italian and German ConstitutionalLaw

Serious problems can arise in cases of conflict between national
standards for the protection of fundamental rights and the Community standard, particularly in cases where the national standard
goes beyond that recognized under Community law. In such instances, there is a tension between the desire for the optimum protection of the fundamental rights of the citizen and the desire for
uniformity of Community law. This problem has thus far arisen
particularly in the context of Italian and German constitutional
law because these two member states have constitutional courts.
The majority of the Italian tribunals which have considered the
problem have taken the view that the probability of such conflict is
highly unlikely.12 9 The Italian Constitutional Court has even stated
that such a conflict would be "aberrant" and "extremely improbable." 130 Nevertheless, the Italian Court has been careful to reserve
for itself the right, in an extreme case, to question the law of the
Treaty itself if its effect were to permit substantial infringement of
fundamental rights.13 1
126 Id.
127 See, e.g., Cohen-Jonathan, Droits de l'homme et pluralitC des systmes europ~ens de
protection internationale,5 REV. DR. DE L'HOMME 615 (1972); Petersmann, The Protection
of FundamentalRights in the European Communities, 1975 EuR. Y.B. 179; Philip, La cour
de justice des communaut~s europkennes et la protection des droits fondamentaux dans
l'ordre juridique communautaire, 21 ANN. FR. DR. INT'L 387 (1975).
I'l 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 103) 1 (1977), quoted in Young-Anawaty, supra note 10, at
71.
"I See, e.g., Pescatore, supra note 12, at 635-36.
130 See Commission of the European Communities, supra note 89, at 10.
221 See id.

1983]

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN

EEC

LAW

The problem is even more acute in Germany. A number of German legal scholars have declared that national protection of fundamental rights must continue so long as the Community has estab182
lished similar and adequate protection of fundamental rights.
They have argued that the fundamental rights enshrined in the
Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland must have priority over Community law. The German courts also have raised a
number of concerns over the adequacy of Community law in the
area of fundamental rights and the potential conflict between
Community law and German constitutional law.1 33
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the German Federal
Constitutional Court went so far as to claim the right to examine
secondary Community law, stating that the fundamental rights
contained in the German Basic Law formed an integral part of the
Basic Law and that there could be no transfer of sovereignty with
respect to that vital function of the Constitution. The Court then
concluded that:
So long as the process of Community integration has progressed
to the stage where Community Law also contains a codified catalogue of fundamental rights which has been passed by a parliament, . . . a court in the Federal Republic of Germany may and
should approach the Federal Constitutional Court to determine
the validity of a Community Law, after the ruling of the European Court of Justice provided for in Article 177 of the Treaty
has been obtained, if the court considers the provision of Community Law relevant to its decision inapplicable in the interpretation
given by the European Court of Justice because and in so far as it
conflicts with one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Basic Law."3
Although the European Parliament and Commission and a majority of legal scholars have criticized the decision of the German
Constitutional Court'3 5 and although the Court later adopted a
'3 See, e.g., Wagner and Wengler, cited in Pescatore, supra note 12, at 633.
'33 See, e.g., Finanzgericht Bremen, 3 September 1963; Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt am
Main II. Kammer, 17 December 1963. See Pescatore, supra note 12, at 632-35 for a further
discussion of these and other cases and of German doctrinal writings on the issues.
'1 Judgment of May 29, 1974, 37 Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfG] (No. 18) 271,
quoted in Drzemczewski, FundamentalRights and the European Communities: Recent Developments, 2 THE HuM. RTS. REV. 69, 72-73 (1977).
8 See Brown & McBride, Observations on the Proposed Accession by the European
Community to the European Convention on Human Rights, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 691, 693
(1981); Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 7; E. Cerexhe, supra
note 124, at 8-9.
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more conciliatory stance, 1 6 it must be recognized that the German
Court and the German doctrinal writers have a legitimate concern.
Indeed, their concern that the transnational integrationist movement not be allowed to ignore or to violate fundamental rights is to
be applauded. The challenge facing the Community is that it cannot ignore the threat to Community unity posed by the German
(and Italian) approach, nor can it ignore the concerns raised about
the protection of fundamental rights.
The following section of the Article will examine some of the
possible solutions to this problem and the various alternatives
which are available for the protection of fundamental rights in the
future.
IV.

OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

There are basically three methods by which the protection of
fundamental rights at the Community level could be reinforced.
The first is, quite simply, the continued evolution and development of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. The second
method is the formal adherence by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The third alternative involves the drafting of a
comprehensive catalogue of fundamental rights which would become part of Community law.
A.

The Role of the Court of Justice

In a sense, the Court of Justice has partially preempted the German and Italian national court decisions. As previously noted, the
Court of Justice has declared that fundamental rights form an integral part of the "general principles of law" the observance of
which it ensures and has looked to national constitutions and to
international human rights law for guidelines as to the content of
these rights. The activist approach of the Court largely protects
the fundamental rights of individuals while at the same time maintains the central position of the Court as final arbiter on Community law, a position which is necessary to Community unity.
Yet, for all the creativity and activism of the Court, the case
method for the protection of fundamental rights nevertheless remains deficient. First, the method cannot fully allay the fears of
" See Europfiische Grundrechtszeitachrift, July 25, 1979, cited in Dubois, supra note 95,
at 620.
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national constitutional courts. Although the maximum standard
approach to the use of national constitutional rights allows the
Court of Justice to recognize a great many constitutionally guaranteed rights, it does not allow the Court to recognize all of these
rights. The Court is forced into adopting a "flexible maximum
standard." If it adopts an "absolute maximum standard," its own
supremacy will be ousted and the principle of Community unity
will be lost."'7 Yet, the flexible approach means that there will inevitably be some constitutional rights which will not meet the test
of commonality. In such cases, the potential for national judicial
"rebellion" remains.
A second problem with the case method is the lack of predictability and certainty. As the Commission has noted:
[H]owever... worthy of approval the method developed by the
Court may be, it cannot rectify at least one of the shortcomings
affecting the legal order of the Communities through the lack of a
written catalogue of fundamental rights: the impossibility of
knowing in advance which are the liberties which may not be infringed by the Community institutions under any circumstances.
The European citizen has a legitimate interest in having his
rights vis-A-vis the Community laid down in advance.""
Such advance knowledge would, of course, lend a greater degree of
predictability to the outcome of any legal dispute. Advance knowledge and increased certainty regarding fundamental rights would
also encourage greater respect for those rights. Individuals will be
more vigilant and jealous of their rights if they are aware at the
outset of the existence of those rights. Furthermore, institutions
will be more careful in their actions if there is a ready and available set of norms, a catalogue of rights, against which those actions
can be judged.
The third potential problem with the case method is that it may
place the Court in the position of an institutional role conflict. The
Court has established its own unique role as an institution. It has
developed its own history and institutional integrity. The single
most obvious and pervasive aspect of this role has been its strong
commitment to the principle of European integration and to the
Community legal order. This position, which necessarily implies a
strong commitment to Community institutions and organs, might
13' For a discussion of the principle of Community unity, see supra notes 113-116 and

accompanying text.
"I Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 7.
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seriously conflict with the Court's other role as defender of fundamental rights. Moreover, the broad and imprecise restrictions
placed upon the exercise of fundamental rights in the Court's own
jurisprudence' " tend to encourage such conflict. The suitability
and integrity of the Court could be called into question in situations involving controversy between the protection of fundamental
rights and the protection of vital interests of Community organs.
Another aspect of this problem involves perceptions of institutional role conflict. It has been said many times that justice must
not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. The potential
for role conflict could lead to problems of justice not being seen to
be done. Indeed, some authors have already questioned whether
justice can be done in cases of sharp role conflict: "The Court's
.. . strong commitment to European integration, to the support of
Community organs and the new legal order, calls into question its
suitability as a forum to adjudicate controversies involving fundamental rights posed against vital interests of Community organs
and their acts. . .

Indications of role conflict can already be

found in the Court's jurisprudence, such as the restrictive attitude
of the Court in cases of individual challenges to regulations under
article 173 of the Treaty of Rome and in cases in which the Court
has been more lenient with the Community organs1 when
it consid41
ered their acts to be of benefit to the Community.
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice is itself capable of providing
at least a partial solution to these problems. If the trend in the
jurisprudence of the Court has been correctly identified and if the
arguments concerning the use of a "flexible maximum standard"
with respect to international law are also correct, the Court may be
in a position to incorporate significant portions of the International Bill of Rights, in addition to the European Convention on
Human Rights, into Community law. If the Court were to do so, it
could elminiate some, though not all, of the problems mentioned
above. These international instruments could provide a rough
standard against which Community acts could be measured prior
to court action. The problem of uncertainty would thus largely be
"

"Within the Community legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights

should, if necessary, be subject to certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued
by the Community.. ." I Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgrosshandlung v. Comm'n of the
European Communities, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 508, 14 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 338, 354-

55.
140

See Economides & Weiler, supra note 109, at 687.

141

Id. at 687 n.15.
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resolved. The use of international human rights law would also
strengthen the role of the Court as protector of fundamental
rights. However, it could only partially resolve the problem of "institutional role conflict." Only a formal Community Charter of
Rights or formal adherence to the European Convention on
Human Rights could satisfactorily resolve this particular problem.
However, the potential for "national judicial rebellion" would still
remain. The further development of the jurisprudence of the Court
would not meet the condition stipulated by the German Federal
Constitutional Court in Handelsgesellschaft1 42 as a prerequisite for
a change in its position: "that Community Law also contains a
codified catalogue of fundamental rights" which has been "passed
by a Parliament."
The foregoing discussion leads to two general conclusions. First,
the Court of Justice has not exhausted its creative role in the protection of fundamental rights. There remains considerable scope
for the further development of the principles which the Court has
established to date. Yet, it is also clear that the case method
presents a number of problems, the nature of which is such that
they cannot be left unresolved. Hence, although the Court must
continue to play a cardinal role in the protection of fundamental
rights, the case method alone can no longer suffice.
The following sections of the Article will examine the two other
principal methods which have been suggested for ensuring the optimum protection of fundamental rights in Community law, notably, accession by the Community to the European Convention on
Human Rights1 43 and a comprehensive Community catalogue of

rights.

"' Judgment of May 29, 1974, 37 BVerfG (No. 18) 271, quoted in Drzemczewski, supra
note 134, at 72-73.
148 The question of accession is such a complex matter that limitations of time and space
preclude a comprehensive treatment of the subject in this Article. Therefore, only a brief
outline of some of the major issues will be presented. For further discussion of accession, see
Brown & McBride, supra note 135; Economides & Weiler, supra note 109; Leuprecht,
Problems Relating to the Accession of the European Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights, Paper delivered at the Colloquy on the European Communities
and the European Convention on Human Rights, International Institute of Human Rights,
June 10-11, 1982; Proceedings of the International Convention on the European Communities and Human Rights, Venice, November 9-11, 1979; Proceedings on the Colloquy on the
Accession of the European Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights,
Louvain-LaNeuve, February 7, 1980.
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Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights
1. Introduction

In a 1979 memorandum, l4 the Commission of the European
Communities has strongly recommended accession by the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights.4 5 Accession
also has been supported by the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, 14 6 the Economic and Social Committee of the
European Community, 147 and the European Parliament. 1 48 In addi-

tion,149increasing doctrinal and political support for accession exists.

Indeed, the Federal Minister of Justice of the Federal Re-

public of Germany has declared that:
[A] uniform application of the Convention in the territories of
all the States Parties to the Convention requires ...

its applica-

tion to acts of the European Communities. It would not make
sense if acts which, being subject to the binding effect of the Convention as acts of a State Party to the Convention, should be
freed from this binding effect for the mere reason that, as a result
of that State joining the European Communities they are no
longer made on the national level but by the organs of the Communities. I am sure that it was not the intention of the Fathers of
the European Communities here to create again a new Space
where the Convention does not apply. For this reason, the Federal Government has been recommending for some time that the
European Communities should accede to the Convention.' 0
Moreover, if one steps outside of the realm of fundamental
rights, it is possible to discern a general process of accession by the
Community to the Council of Europe's various conventions. For
144Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 5.
146

This recent memorandum represents an interesting change of position by the Commis-

sion. In an earlier memorandum, the Commission had argued that accession was unnecessary. See Commission of the European Communities, supra note 89.
146 PARL. Ass. CONc. EuR. RES. 745 (1981) (relating to the accession of the European Communities to the European Human Rights Convention); EUR. CONSULT. Ass. DEB. 32D SE S.

765 (Jan. 27, 1981) (debate on the Report of the Legal Affairs Committee, Doc. 4649).
1'
23 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. 6353) 1 (1980).
I'l See Leuprecht, La Communautk et la Convention europ~ennedes Droits de 'Homme,
3 F. 3 (1982).
'4 See, e.g., Leuprecht, supra note 143; Leuprecht, supra note 148, at 3. But see
Economides & Weiler, supra note 109; E. Cerexhe, supra note 124; Brown & McBride,
supra note 135.
I" Speech by H.J. Vogel, Federal Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany,
Fifth International Colloquy on the European Convention on Human Rights, Frankfurt,
Apr. 9-12, 1980, noted in Leuprecht, supra note 143.
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example, in December 1981 the Community became a contracting
party to the Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife
and Natural Habitats, which it had signed in September 1979 in
Berne.'' Protocols are also being negotiated to enable the Community to accede to the three European agreements on medical and
customs matters.'"5 Accession to the Human Rights Convention
may therefore be viewed as part of a larger process of accession by
the Community to European treaties.
Accession in the human rights field, however, raises a number of
difficult problems. This has led some commentators to question
"whether the game is worth the candle."'" The next section of the
Article will briefly examine the principal arguments for and against
accession.
2.

Arguments for and Against Accession

The first argument advanced by the Commission in favour of accession is that it would enhance the image of Europe as an area of
freedom and democracy in the world. In the words of the Commission, it would "make clear to the whole world that the Community
...
is determined to improve in real terms the protection of
human rights by binding itself to a written catalogue of fundamental freedoms."'" More importantly, accession would "strengthen
the position of Western European democracies as a whole in defending a universal and indivisible concept of human rights in the
face of attempts to render the realisation of certain fundamental
rights subservient to certain other rights (e.g. 'right to peace,'
'right to development')." 5 5 Additionally, it would provide a set of
basic formal criteria for adhesion to and membership in the EEC,
underlining the fact that respect for fundamental rights forms an
56
essential element of membership.
The Commission also suggests that accession would reduce the
risk of national courts' reviewing Community acts by reference to
57
the human rights provisions of their national constitutions.

Is' COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FIFTEENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE Ac-

TIVITIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 148 (1981).
15
15

Id. at 256.
Brown & McBride, supra note 135, at 704.

154 Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 11.
"

Leuprecht, supra note 143, at 3. The author is in full accord with Mr. Leuprecht's

insightful comment.
1"s Id.
15, Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 7.
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Thus, the risk of "national judicial rebellion" would be minimized.
In addition to the above political advantages, accession would
have certain legal advantages. It would, if accompanied by acceptance of the right of individual petition, reduce the number of divergent interpretations of the Human Rights Convention by the
Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice.15 It would also
provide greater clarity and certainty.
On the other hand, it has been argued by some that the rights
contained in the Convention and Protocols are not especially relevant to Community activities. The Convention deals with the
traditional civil and political freedoms rather than with the economic and social rights which are of particular importance to the
Community. Nevertheless, the Convention does contain certain
provisions that are of potential significance to the Community. 159
Examples of these are the right to respect for private and family
life, home and correspondence found in article 8,160 the right to

freedom of peaceful assembly and association in article 11,111 and
the right to property and right to education found in the First Additional Protocol to the Convention. 6 2 Additionally, the Fourth
Protocol to the Convention contains provisions relating to the free
movement of persons.163 Moreover, Community accession might
provide further impetus to the idea of incorporating certain economic and social rights in the Convention.
The possibility of extending the scope of the Convention to inLeuprecht, supra note 143, at 5.
" See Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 13; Proceedings of the

International Convention on the European Communities and Human Rights, Venice, November 9-11, 1979, at 166; see also Leuprecht, supra note 143, at 8.
1

For the text of article 8, see supra note 103.

'6'

Article 11(1) reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to

freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for
the protection of his interests." Id.
' Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention, Mar. 2, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262,
states, in part: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and
subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international
law." Id. Article 2 states, in part: "No person shall be denied the right to education." Id.
1" Article 2 of the Fourth Protocol to the Convention, May 2, 1968, in A. ROBERTSON,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (2d ed. 1977), states, in part: "(1) Everyone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence. (2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including
his own." Id. Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol states: "(1) No one shall be expelled, by means
either of an individual or of a collective measure, from the territory of the State of which he
is a national. (2) No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State of
which he is a national." Id. Article 4 adds: "Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited." Id.
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clude some of the rights enumerated in the European Social Charter' " is now under consideration by the Council of Europe. 6 Accession would allow the Community, with its special interest in
economic and social rights, to play an important and constructive
role in furthering this new development.
The greatest difficulty with the notion of accession is arguably
the host of complex technical problems that it engenders. Accordingly, the following section of the Article will explore some of the
major technical difficulties which must be resolved if accession is
ever to become reality.
3.

Juridical and Institutional Problems of Accession

The most obvious difficulty is that the Human Rights Convention is clearly intended for participation by sovereign states. This
has led jurists to question whether significant alterations to the
Convention will be required to enable the Community to adhere.
The Commission has argued that no significant amendments would
be necessary 6 and that the provisions of the Convention could apply mutatis mutandis to the Community. Certain minor adjust67
ments could be made in a Protocol of Accession.1
Another aspect of this problem concerns the capacity of the
Community, with its limited powers, to guarantee the procedural
rights of the Convention. Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention, the "free elections" provision, is an example of a stipulation which may cause difficulties in this regard. The Commission
has suggested that it may be necessary to enter a reservation under
article 64 of the Convention in order to adequately resolve the
problem.168 In addition, another reservation may be necessary with
respect to article 14 of the Convention, the non-discrimination provision, in view of the Community's preferential treatment of its citizens within Community territory." 9
Another difficulty would relate to the individual right of petition
s4 For an analysis of the Charter, see Evans, The European Social Charter, in FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 278-90 (J. Bridge, D. Lasok, D. Perrott & R. Plender eds. 1973).
'" COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 15 (1981). See
Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 5.
'" Id. at 15. Leuprecht has argued that the "mutatis mutandis formula" carries certain
potential difficulties and that "a clearer-cut solution in the framework on an instrument of
accession" would be preferable. Leuprecht, supra note 143, at 10.
!7
Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 15.

I
'n

Id.
Id.

710

GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.

[Vol. 13:667

established under the Convention. As the Commission has noted:
If accession is to bring about a substantial improvement in the
protection of fundamental rights, it would be desirable, if not entirely indispensable, for the Community to recognize not only the
competence of the Court of Human Rights but also to allow the
individual right of petition provided 170
for in Article 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Difficulties could arise, however, if a Member State of the Community had not itself accepted the individual right of petition. As a
possible solution, the Commission has recommended that a transitional period be established following accession during which petitions would be denied.17 1 It is suggested, however, that Leuprecht's
argument that negotiations toward accession should be "accompanied by parallel political initiatives to secure the recognition and
continued acceptance of the right of individual petition by all
Member States of the Community"'' is the better position.
In summary, it is clear that accession would raise many technical
problems requiring important and complex negotiations. Nevertheless, none of these technical and institutional problems are insoluble, provided that sufficient political will to ameliorate the protection of fundamental rights in Europe exist.
4. Conclusions on Accession
The foregoing analysis of arguments for and against accession
17
leads to the conclusion that accession is a goal to be pursued. 1
There is no doubt that formal adherence to the Convention's normative framework and implementation mechanisms would enhance
the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Nor is there any
doubt that the juridical and institutional problems of accession are
soluble. Accession is a viable policy option.
Is it, however, to be considered merely as "a possible first step,
but under no circumstances.

. .

an end in itself?'" 4 Should acces-

sion be viewed as a first step toward the development of a unique
Community catalogue of fundamental rights? To answer these
queries, the third possible option for the future, the Community
170

Id.

171

Leuprecht, supra note 148, at 8.

173 Speech

by H.J. Vogel, Federal Minister of Justice of the Federal Republic of Germany,
supra note 150.
17
Economides and Weiler, supra note 109, at 694.
174 Id.
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catalogue of rights, will be examined.
C.

A Catalogue of Fundamental Rights

A number of scholars have argued that a catalogue of fundamental rights specifically tailored for the Community would provide
the most effective manner of protecting basic rights. 175 Such a catalogue of rights would largely resolve the problems currently surrounding the case method approach of the Court of Justice. The
need for certainty would be met, for a catalogue would establish in
the clearest fashion the fundamental rights of the Community's
citizens. The problems of "national judicial rebellion" and institutional role conflict would also be largely resolved. Moreover, a catalogue would have a number of positive political implications. It
would, for example, stand as a clear symbol to the world of the
Community's commitment to the protection of fundamental rights.
Most importantly, however, it would provide a series of norms especially tailored to the Community's specific needs.
It has thus far been impossible, however, to obtain agreement on
the content of such a catalogue.17 6 Moreover, the Commission has
indicated that such agreement will likely not be obtained for some
time. 17 7 Therefore, the elaboration of a Community Charter appears to be at best a long term proposition.
It would be far better to devote energy to the inclusion of economic and social rights in the Convention rather than to the elaboration of a unique Community charter of rights. The Select Committee on the European Communities of the House of Lords
believes that if additional human rights norms, i.e. economic and
social rights, are to become generally acceptable in Europe, they
should be incorporated in the Convention on Human Rights rather
than in rules affecting solely the Community. 17 European unity
and the protection of fundamental rights would be better served
by the inclusion of economic and social rights in the Convention
and by the revision and updating of the European Social Charter.
The Community should accede to both documents-the Convention and the Charter-to contribute its expertise to the further de-

See, e.g., Economides and Weiler, supra note 109.
M7Commission of the European Communities, supra note 9, at 5.
I" Id.
'78Sub-Committee on Human Rights of the Select Committee on the European Communities, House of Lords, Session 1979-80, 71st Report, 6724/79 Corn (79) 210, p. XVII, noted
in Leuprecht, supra note 148, at 6, 16.
170
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velopment of those instruments. Such a course would contribute
more to the protection of fundamental rights than the elaboration
of a uniquely Community catalogue of rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article examines the concept of fundamental rights in the
context of European Economic Community law. The study of fundamental rights in European Economic Community law is of conceptual importance in a number of respects. First, the notion of
fundamental rights in EEC law is intimately related to the socioeconomic nature and objectives of the Community, thus providing
an opportunity for the clarification and conceptual development of
many of the newly recognized economic and social rights. Since
there has not yet developed an extensive body of national and international jurisprudence with respect to the more recently formulated economic and social rights, European Economic Community
law is in a unique position to play a leadership role in the development of the jurisprudence relating to economic and social rights.
In analyzing the contribution of EEC law, both actual and potential, this Article examines the specific provisions of the Treaty
of Rome dealing with fundamental rights. Although many commentators have stated that there are no references to fundamental
rights in the Treaty of Rome, the Article demonstrates that the
Treaty does in fact contain a number of specific provisions relating
to fundamental rights. The analysis of the fundamental rights provisions of the Treaty indicates that some rights, such as freedom of
movement, for example, blend both the negative and the positive
aspects of human rights. The distinction between positive and negative rights leads to the imposition of an overly mechanistic and
lexicographic relationship on rights which are in reality interdependent and inconceivable outside the context of each other. EEC
law suggests that the distinctions between these two sets of rights
are not as clear or as categorical as many have thought. A new
conceptualization and classification of human rights is required to
bridge the dichotomy between positive and negative rights. Recently, a number of unitary theories of human rights has been formulated with the specific intention of bridging the dichotomy.
In the European context, a comprehensive unitary approach to
human rights would be not only conceptually sound but also the
best means of ensuring the optimum protection of the rights of the
individual. The Article therefore examines the questions of accession by the Community to the European Convention on Human
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Rights and the formulation of a comprehensive Community catalogue of rights. This unitary approach is desirable because certain
gaps exist in the current EEC framework for the protection of fundamental rights. Notably, the Treaty of Rome does not provide a
comprehensive catalogue of rights. Moreover, while the Court of
Justice has done much to extend the protection of fundamental
rights, there nevertheless remains a number of unresolved
problems, including the continuing potential for national "judicial
rebellion," the lack of predictability and certainty in identifying
rights in the EEC legal system, and the continuing potential for
institutional role conflict. The Article reviews the arguments for
and against accession by the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights, concluding that accession is a viable goal
which should be pursued with vigor and determination. The Article also suggests that efforts be devoted to the elaboration and inclusion of economic and social rights in the Convention on Human
Rights.
Although both European unity and the protection of fundamental rights in Europe would be better served by accession, this could
only serve as a first step, a beginning in the re-conceptualization of
fundamental rights in Europe. The further challenge will be to
turn the unitary theory of human rights into practical reality. Accession would be the first step in that process.
European Economic Community law is now in a position to
make an outstanding contribution to the conceptualization of fundamental rights by clarifying the content of economic and social
rights and by turning the unitary approach to human rights into
practical reality. This Article is intended to highlight the importance of EEC law and its future development for the theory and
practice of human rights and to stimulate greater interest in the
relationship between EEC law and the field of human rights
generally.

